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Abstract
In this paper we propose a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm for supporting
the definition of a personal income tax reform. As a case study, we apply this
methodology to the Italian income tax, and consider a recently implemented tax
cut. Our optimization algorithm is able to determine a set of tax structures
that maximize the redistributive effect of the tax while minimizing its inefficiency
— considering for the former the Reynolds-Smolensky index and for the latter
the weighted average of taxpayers’ effective marginal tax rates. The approach
also takes into account two additional factors: the tax has to guarantee a
specific revenue and to minimize the share of losing taxpayers with respect to
the pre-reform situation. Experimental results clearly demonstrate that the
methodology we employ can support the policy-maker’s decisions in complex, real-
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1. Introduction
One of the main issues regularly faced by any government in a real-world
situation is if and how to consider and implement substantial tax reforms or a
modification of some parameters of a specific tax [1, 2]. In this work we focus
on the personal income tax (PIT), that in all developed countries is the most
important tax with respect to the total tax revenue as well as to its influence on
economic efficiency and equity. PIT is also a perfect case study for a decision
support system (DSS) problem, since its structure is generally very complex and
characterized by dozens of parameters, such as marginal tax rates, upper limits of
thresholds, several allowances and deductions, and tax credits.
Designing a PIT reform becomes a more and more complex task if the
natural multi-objective nature of the problem is considered. To the classical
revenue objective, other issues related both to social equity and efficiency of the
newly designed systems should be adopted: the government can be interested in
increasing the redistributive effect exerted by the tax system, but in so doing it can
affect its efficiency. As for the redistributive effect in this paper we consider the
Reynolds-Smolensky index (RS) [3], while for efficiency we employ the weighted
average of taxpayers’ effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs).
We then try to solve these important issues when thinking of a tax reform. We
got the idea by a recently tax cut implemented by the Italian government, that
involved only one parameter of the tax; its goal was to increase the purchasing
power of “poor” employees, as well as employees belonging to the “middle class”
(a proxy for the redistributive effect maximization). This reform substantially
increased both RS and EMTRs, that is it improved equity and worsened efficiency
(in addition to a remarkable worsening of the re-ranking effect) with respect to
the situation observed before the tax reform.
Here we show that a set of other feasible tax structures, all reducing the tax
revenue by the same amount, involving all the tax parameters and all taxpayers
as well as better balancing equity and efficiency (and in the meanwhile keeping
under control the re-ranking effect), are possible. Our methodology exploits an
evolutionary algorithm, as such heuristics approaches have been demonstrated well
suited to tackle complex real-world scenarios [4, 5, 6]. We then compare our results
both with the effect of the reform recently implemented by the Italian government,
and the one estimated in the article by Morini and Pellegrino [7], which is also
based on an evolutionary algorithm framework.
In particular, fixing the tax revenue at the level observed after the government’s
tax reform, our evolutionary algorithm maximizes the redistributive effect and
minimizes the inefficiency. Moreover, it also allows to satisfy an other fundamental
factor: by considering the pre-reform tax structure, the computed set of admittable
tax structures minimizes the share of losing taxpayers (in so doing we avoid the
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redistributive effect to increase only because the richest taxpayers are facing higher
tax liabilities and increase the possibility that such a reform can be politically
feasible). Among these results, the government can then choose the favorite one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the purposes of the
paper by explaining its contribution to the existing literature. Section 3 describes
the structure of the Italian PIT, and the reform implemented by the government.
Section 4 shows equity and efficiency measures. Section 5 introduces the micro-
simulation model we employ for the empirical analysis and discusses the effects
of the government tax reform on the equity and efficiency grounds. Section 6
describes TED (from the worlds “Tax”, “Evolutionary”, and “Decision”). Section
7 presents and discusses the results. Section 8 offers the conclusions.
2. Problem Definition and State of the Art
As stated in the introduction, our paper deals with a multi-facet problem of
designing a DSS for supporting the decision makers in the complex process of
reforming the PIT structure. The DSS is based on a multi-objective evolutionary
algorithm and explicitly considers multiple objectives. Due to the very limited
literature in DSS for PIT and the multidisciplinary nature of our research,
we explore the related literature along two main axes: PIT policies and their
evaluation, and multi-objective evolutionary algorithms.
2.1. PIT Policies and their Evaluation
Generally speaking, the degree of progressivity of a tax system observed in a
country depends on several issues, such as the social preferences for redistribution,
the level of inefficiency exerted by the overall tax system, the level of the total tax
revenue desired by the community, and the composition of such total tax revenue,
since it influences the economic growth. As a consequence, the optimal mix of
these issues is country specific1.
1Some communities prefer higher degree of progressivity at the expense of efficiency; on the
contrary, other communities prefer very low efficiency costs of taxation at the expense of the
redistributive effect of the tax system. The some goes for the desired level (and composition)
of the overall tax revenue (and consequently the desired level of the overall public spending):
some countries have very high level of public spending and (consequently) tax revenue (e.g.,
Scandinavian countries), other have considerably lower values (e.g., US). Until the level of
the public spending to be financed is low, efficiency costs of taxation are of little importance,
and the greater concerns are focused on the possibility of obtaining the desired level of tax
progressivity; on the other hand, when the level of public spending is high, efficiency costs of
taxation become the key issue of the economic debate. Then “if society cares about inequality and
poverty, there will always be some willingness to sacrifice a part of national income in order to
achieve distributional objectives. The fundamental design issue is to minimize such losses while
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In this respect, economic literature has first identified the axioms to be required
in order to equally apportion the burden of taxation among citizens [9, 10], with
particular attention to the PIT structure on which we focus from now on: for a
large set of utility functions the principles of equal sacrifice justify a progressive
tax system. This fundamental result does not solve the problem of both how high
the degree of progressivity and how high the level of the highest statutory marginal
tax rate should be2.
For what concerns equity, the empirical studies evaluating the redistributive
effect of the tax (or its improvements or deteriorations as a consequence of a
tax reform) draw their conclusions from these redistributive indexes, such as the
Reynolds-Smolensky index as well as the Kakwani and Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani
ones [11]. In so doing, they stress the importance of the equity side of the problem,
relegating to the background the efficiency side.
On the contrary, in the last decades the theoretical literature primarily
concentrates on the equity-efficiency trade-off in optimum taxation following the
methodology implemented by Mirrlees [12]. The results of this strand of the
literature are not particularity useful for real-world tax policy design, since they
employ stylized tax structure, and their solutions depend on the utility function
considered; as a consequence, empirical works centre the attention on behavioral
elasticities as the key parameters to draw conclusions on the efficiency costs of a
tax or a tax reform [13].
One strand of the empirical literature focuses on the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the net wage. These studies find that this overall wage elasticity
is very low, but it is decreasing with earned income: the wage elasticity is high for
workers belonging to the bottom part of the income distribution and for married
woman as well as older workers and it is very low for workers belonging to the top
deciles of the income distribution [14, 15, 8]. From a policy recommendation point
of view, these results are in favor of low marginal tax rates on poorer workers, and
high marginal tax rates on richest ones, which in the meanwhile positively affect
equity; this example underlines that the standard equity-efficiency trade-off can
be not always verified [15, 16].
Another and more recent strand of the literature criticized some aspect of the
results based on the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the net wage. In
particular, this literature underlines that people reach to tax changes not only by
raising sufficient revenue to finance desired public services and satisfy concerns over inequality
and poverty” [8].
2Today again the most important public economics textbooks discuss the ability-to-pay
approach and the principles of equal sacrifice in the chapter regarding the theory of taxation,
whilst they focus the attention on the the statistical and redistributive indexes when they handle
with the evaluation of the effect of taxation on the income distribution.
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modifying their labour supply, but also by varying their effort, by reducing their
tax compliance (i.e. by increasing tax evasion or by modifying taxable income
by means of tax allowances and deductions). The parameter that can handle
with all these possible responses to tax change is the elasticity of taxable income
(ETI), which also allows to evaluate the dead-weight loss exerted by the PIT [17].
According to this strand of the literature, the estimated values of ETI vary across
countries and years, and this elasticity seems to be particularly relevant for higher
income individuals, whilst almost nil for lower income ones. The guideline of all
this ETI literature underlines the efficiency concerns, whilst the redistributive ones
are basically not taken into account.
Putting together, these two branches of the literature suggest focusing on
the elasticity of labour supply when focusing on the bottom part of the income
distribution, and on the elasticity of taxable income when considering top income
earners [8].
It has to be noted that the economic literature primarily treats the problem of
designing or re-designing the whole tax system or the whole structure of a specific
tax, so that its conclusions are not sic et simpliciter applicable to a real-world
situation, since governments have to balance other important short-run issues,
such as the tax revenue to be collected and the political feasibility of the tax
modification. As a consequence, “. . . there is no one-size-fits-all tax reform. Any
tax reform must consider the institutions, the traditions, the economic policies,
and especially the politics of the current and specific state situation. This means
in particular that tax reforms must balance the various trade-offs that necessarily
and inevitably exist between the need to generate revenues but to do so in an
efficient and a fair way” [18]. In this respect, Morini and Pellegrino [7] underline
that “ . . . in order to implement a reform, the government usually changes some
parameters of the tax compatible with its revenue constraint. Whether such a tax
structure change is aimed at achieving the best way to obtain the specific target is
debatable.”
This paper tries to fit all these arguments by proposing a methodology for
an equity-efficiency evaluation of real-world tax reforms, with a specific focus on
the personal income tax; it can be particularly useful for helping policy-makers in
setting a short-run PIT reform by balancing equity and efficiency concerns3.
3Up to now examples in the literature of empirical strategies that both measure and balance
the redistributive effect of the PIT and its inefficiency when considering real-world complex tax
systems and the need for a government to implement a short-run tax reform are rare. Most of
the results of the literature imply upheavals of the existing structure of the tax, hardly feasible at
least in the short run. As a consequence, two partial evaluations are possible: given the structure
of the PIT applied in a specific country and its redistributive effect, it is possible (under certain
conditions) to measure the overall dead-weight loss exerted by the tax; on the contrary, forgetting
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In order to approach all these complex phenomena, we consider a recent tax cut
implemented by the Italian government. In particular, the government decided to
change one parameter of this tax in order to reduce the net tax liability only for a
specific group of taxpayers. The result is an increase of the redistributive power of
the tax at the expenses of both the average level of taxpayers’ marginal tax rates
(which we consider for the efficiency evaluation) and the re-ranking effect. By
employing a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm, we are able to deal with most
of the results of the above cited literature. In particular, our empirical strategy
find a numerous set of equal-yield tax structures involving all the parameters of the
tax and all the taxpayers; these tax reforms are all equally optimal for the problem
under discussion, and depict several combinations of equity and efficiency.
In this our first attempt the dead-weight loss exerted by the tax on top income
taxpayers is not explicitly considered, since here we discuss a tax reform reducing
the tax revenue with no losing taxpayers with respect the situation observed before
the tax reform; consequently, we can impose the highest statutory marginal tax
rate to be lower or at most equal the present one without loss of generality; on
the contrary, following the results of the literature on the wage elasticity, we ask
the optimization core to balance the redistributive effect by lowering the effective
marginal tax rates with a particular emphasis on the bottom part of the income
distribution.
2.2. Evolutionary Computation
Evolution is the biological theory that animals and plants have their origin
in other types, and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications
in successive generations. Natural evolution is based on random variations, but
it is not a random process: variations are rejected or preserved according to
objective evaluations, and only changes that are beneficial to the individuals
are likely to spread into subsequent generations. Darwin called this principle
“natural selection”, a deterministic process where random variations simply “afford
materials” [19].
Whether natural selection causes variations to be accumulated in one specific
direction, the result may strikingly resemble a deliberate optimization process.
However, such optimization processes only required to assess the effect of random
changes and not the ability to design intelligent modifications. Several scholars and
practitioners were inspired by such an outcome and tried to reproduce the process
for solving practical optimization problems in various application domains, while
others tried to mimic it to better understand its underlying mechanisms.
about the efficiency side, it is possible to evaluate its redistributive effect. If these effects are too
high or too low, then it is possible to think about a possible tax reform, that inevitably would
affect both the efficiency and the redistributive effect.
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Evolutionary Computation (EC) is the offshoot of computer science focusing on
algorithms loosely inspired by the theory of evolution. The definition is deliberately
vague since the boundaries of the field are not, and cannot be, sharply defined.
EC is a branch of computational intelligence, and it is included into the broad
framework of bio-inspired meta-heuristics.
EC does not have a single recognizable origin. Some scholars identify its
starting point in 1950, when Alan Turing drew attention to the similarities
between learning and evolution [20]. Others pointed out the inspiring ideas that
appeared later in the decade, despite the fact that the lack of computational power
impaired their diffusion in the broader scientific community [21]. More commonly,
the birth of EC is set in the 1960s with the appearance of three independent
research lines: John Holland’s genetic algorithms ; Lawrence Fogel’s evolutionary
programming ; Ingo Rechenberg’s and Hans-Paul Schwefel’s evolution strategies.
The three paradigms monopolized the field until the 1990s, when John Koza
entered the arena with his genetic programming. Nowadays, all these methods,
together with several variants proposed over the years, have been grouped under
the umbrella term of evolutionary algorithms (EAs) [22].
When EAs are used to tackle a specific problem, an individual is a single
candidate solution, and its fitness is a measure of its capacity of solving the
problem; the set of all candidate solutions that exists at a particular time
represents the population. Artificial evolution proceeds through discrete steps
called generations. In each of them, the population is first expanded, and then
collapsed, mimicking the processes of breeding and struggling for survival. The
population in the first generation may be either completely random or seeded
with existing solutions. Parents are chosen for breeding stochastically, with
the best candidate solutions having higher probabilities to generate offspring.
As a result, new candidate solutions are more likely to inherit favorable traits.
Other considerations, such as age or diversity could also influence the selection
probability, but generally to a smaller extent. Conversely, the removal of
individuals is usually completely deterministic: the less fit, and possibly the oldest,
are deleted.
The mechanisms used to generate the offspring are collectively named genetic
operators. They can be divided into recombinations and mutations: the former
methods mix together the information contained in two or more solutions to create
new ones; the latter ones work by changing the structure of a single solution.
Recombination operators are able to coalesce good characteristics from different
solutions, and provide a very effective mechanism to explore the search space;
mutation operators, on the other hand, allow the fine-tuning of the candidate
solutions. Maintaining a set of solutions, EAs are resilient to the attraction of
local optima.
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In many practical problems, the quality of the solution is defined in relation to
several, conflicting, objectives. In most cases, it is not possible to define a single
fitness function in order to direct the optimization process. Such a scalarization, a
weighted aggregate function, may be unable to model intrinsically multi-objective
scenarios.
Let say that a solution A dominates a solution B (A  B) if A is not inferior
to B for all objectives, and it is strictly superior for at least one (Eq. 1). The
goal of a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA) is to provide a set of
non-dominated solutions, and let the user eventually take the final decision. Such
a set is called Pareto set (or Pareto front) after the XIX century Italian engineer
and economist, who, indeed, originally used the concept in his studies of economic
efficiency and income distribution.
A  B ⇐⇒ ∀i : ai ≥ bi and ∃j : aj > bj (1)
Nowadays, the de-facto standard for MOEA is Deb’s NSGA-II [23], at least when
the solution may be represented as a list of real parameters and the number of
conflicting objectives is limited. However, this is a quite active research topic
among scholars: the topic is of a great practical importance; tackling a multi-
objective problem is significantly more difficult that optimizing a single function;
and finding a Pareto front may not be sufficient, as the user is also expecting
solutions to be quite different.
3. Case Study: the Italian PIT
3.1. The Structure of the 2014 Italian PIT
The 2014 Italian PIT is characterized by about three dozens of parameters that
define its structure. In this Section we present these parameters by describing all
the relevant rules for the transition from the pre- to the post-tax income. Unless
otherwise stated, in this Section numerical values are expressed in euro.
Let x be the generic taxpayer’s gross income. The corresponding taxable
income y is given by the difference between the gross income x and three kinds of
allowances, if this difference is positive; otherwise the taxable income y is equal
to zero. The three allowances are the deduction for the main residence cadastral
income d1, the sum of the deductions for social security contributions and the
alimonies as well as donations d2, and the deduction for the solidarity contribution
d3 = β(x− κ) due only by taxpayers with x > κ. The present tax code considers
κ = 300, 000 and β = 0.03. More precisely,
y =
{
x− d1 − d2 − d3 if d1 + d2 + d3 < x
0 if d1 + d2 + d3 ≥ x (2)
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A rate schedule Ψ(y) is applied to the taxable income y. Ψ(y) considers five
statutory tax rates tj(they are t1 = 0.23, t2 = 0.27, t3 = 0.38, t4 = 0.41, t5 = 0.43)
and four upper (lower) limits ULρ = LLρ+1 of the thresholds (they are UL1 =
15, 000, UL2 = 28, 000, UL3 = 55, 000, and UL4 = 75, 000). By applying Ψ(y) to
y the gross tax liability λ is derived. Finally, the net tax liability τ is equal to the
gross tax liability λ minus three groups of effective tax credits (plus d3 for richest
taxpayers), if this difference is positive; otherwise it is set equal to zero4.
In particular, c1 is the overall tax credit for earned income, c2 is the overall
tax credit for dependent individuals within the household, and c3 is the overall tax
credit for items of expenditure. Only c1 and c2 depend on the pre-tax income
5,
whilst c3 does not.
More formally, the net tax liability τ is evaluated as follows:
τ =
{
λ− c1 − c2 − c3 if λ > c1 + c2 + c3
0 if λ ≤ c1 + c2 + c3 (3)
Having evaluated τ , the net income z is simply the difference between x and τ .
Now we can turn to a detailed description of each kind of effective tax credits,
c1, c2 and c3. c1 is the overall tax credit for earned income. It is the sum of
four different effective tax credits according to the taxpayer’s kind of income c1 =∑4
r=1 c
r
1 where r = 1 refers to employees, r = 2 refers to pensioners younger than
75, r = 3 to pensioners older than 75, and r = 4 to self-employed taxpayers; non-
working taxpayers have a nil tax credit for earned income. In the 2014 tax year
these tax credits have similar but different structures.
In particular, c11 is equal to
c11 =

Ω if xd ≤ A
(Ω− a1) + a1UL2−xdUL2−A if A < xd ≤ UL2
(Ω− a1) UL3−xdUL3−UL2 if UL2 < xd ≤ UL3
0 if xd > UL3
(4)
4Our definition of τ does not consider regional and municipal surtaxes, since their inclusion
does not affect our methodology.
5More precisely, they depend on xd = x − d1 if the main residence is not subject to the
property tax (the vast majority of cases starting from the tax year 2012; in these cases the
cadastral income is considered within the definition of x, but an allowance of the same value is
allowed) and on x if the main residence is subject to the property tax (in these cases the cadastral
income is not included in the definition of x).
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whilst cr1 for r = (2, 3) is equal to
cr1 =

t1mr if xd ≤ mr
(t1mr − ar) + ar UL1−xdUL1−mr if mr < xd ≤ UL1
(t1mr − ar) UL3−xdUL3−UL1 if UL1 < xd ≤ UL3
0 if xd > UL3
(5)
and
c41 =

t1m4 if xd ≤ m4
(t1m4 − a4) UL3−xdUL3−m4 if m4 < xd ≤ UL3
0 if xd > UL3
(6)
where m2 = 7, 500, m3 = 7, 750, m4 = 4, 800, whilst A = 8, 000 6= 8, 145 = m1
(note that mr is the level of xd below which the taxpayer has a nil τ); a1 = 902,
a2 = 470, a3 = 486, a4 = 0; finally, Ω = 1, 880 6= 1, 840 = t1m1.
c2 is the overall effective tax credit for dependent individuals within the
household. It is the sum of four different tax credits according to the kind of
relationship with respect to the taxpayer:
c2 = c
H
2 + c
HF
2 + c
S
2 + c
O
2 (7)
where cH2 is the overall tax credit for dependent children, c
HF
2 is the further tax
credit for households with more than three children, cS2 is the tax credit for the
dependent spouse, and cO2 is the tax credit for other dependent components.
Starting with cH2 , it is equal to
cH2 =
{
cHp2
q+(f−1)e−xd
q+(f−1)e if xd ≤ q + (f − 1)e
0 if xd > q + (f − 1)e
(8)
where f =
∑4
l=1 fl is the overall number of dependent children. Each of them
can be categorized in four groups: f1 is the number of dependent children older
than 3 years if the dependent children within the household are 3 or less; f2 is
the number of dependent children younger than 3 years if the dependent children
within the household are 3 or less; f3 is the number of dependent children older
than 3 years if the dependent children within the household are more than 3; f4 is
the number of dependent children younger than 3 years if the dependent children
within the household are more than 3. q is equal to 95,000, whilst e to 15,000 and
cHp2 =
∑4
l=1 flc
Hpl
2 . The present values for the potential tax credits are c
Hp1
2 = 950,
cHp22 = 1, 150, c
Hp3
2 = 1, 220, and c
Hp4
2 = 1, 420.
A further tax credit cHF2 = 1, 200 is applied to households with more than three
children, provided that cH2 > 0. Note that potential tax credits for dependent
children can be split between spouses whenever both of them have a positive gross
income x; alternately, they can be ascribed to the richest between the spouses.
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The effective tax credit for the spouse is
cS2 =

cSp2 − u xdUL1 if xd ≤ UL1
cSp2 − u if UL1 < xd ≤ w
(cSp2 − u)k−xdk−w if w < xd ≤ k
0 if xd > k
(9)
and
cO2 =
{
cOp2
k−xd
k
if xd ≤ k
0 if xd > k
(10)
where u is equal to 110, w to 40,000, k to 80,000, cSp2 is equal to 800, whilst c
Op
2
to 7506.
Tax credits for items of expenditure c3 can be classified in several groups
according to the percentage of the expense the tax law admits as a tax credit. There
are expenses that allow a tax credit of 19%, 24%, 41%, 50% and 55%, respectively.
Here we consider only two groups: 19% and 50%, as the remaining ones refer
to a very small number of beneficiaries. The 19% tax credits (we label this
variable expenditure1) refer to about twenty different items of expenditure, such as
expenses for health care, mortgage interests, etc.; 50% tax credits (expenditure2)
are allowed for home restructuring-related expenses.
Finally, c3 also includes the tax credit for tenants; it is 300 if the gross income
x is less than 15,494 (we label this variable tenants1); 150 if the gross income
range between 15,494 and 30,987 (tenants2); 992 if the gross income is lower than
15,494 and the taxpayer is younger than 30 years (tenants3)
7.
3.2. The Government Tax Reform
Without modifying the PIT structure, the government introduced a cash
transfer
χ =

960 if m1 < x ≤ 24, 000 & λ > c1
96026,000−x
2,000
if 24, 000 < x < 26, 000 & λ > c1
0 if x ≥ 26, 000
(11)
reserved for employees. As a consequence, taxpayers affected by χ evaluate z as
y − τ + χ, and those for whom τ < χ receive a subsidy. As an example, Figure 1
shows the net effect τ − χ for an employee without dependent individuals before
and after the tax reform.
6For what concerns cS2 , the formula applied by the Italian tax code is a little bit different. In
particular, it considers higher values than cSp2 − u in the income range 29,000–35,200: instead
of 690, values range between 700 and 720. We do not consider these differences in simulations,
always letting cSp2 − u be equal to 690.
7In simulations we do not consider specific thresholds to be applied for this tax credit, and
we impose the above thresholds to be equal to UL1 and UL2, respectively.
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Figure 1: Net Tax Liability for an Employee
4. Measuring Equity and Inefficiency: the Theory
First of all the distribution of pre-tax incomes to which the PIT structure
is applied has to be defined and formalized. We consider a vector of N
pre-tax incomes, x1, x2, ..., xN−1, xN , ranked in non-decreasing order. We call
this distribution X. To each pre-tax income x is associated a sample weight
α1, α2, ..., αN−1, αN , where Υ =
∑N
n=1 αn is the overall number of taxpayers and
X¯ =
∑N
n=1 αnxn is the overall amount of the gross income. To each xn is associated
a corresponding value for the post-tax income zn, as well as for the net tax liability
τn, so that Z¯ =
∑N
n=1 αnzn and T¯ =
∑N
n=1 αnτn are the overall amount of the net
income and the overall amount of the tax revenue, respectively. We call these
distributions Z and T .
4.1. Equity
Inequality among income and tax levels can be measured according to a set
of inequality measures. Here we employ the most famous among them, the Gini
coefficient [24]:
G =
2 · cov(, F ())
µ
(12)
where  = (X,Z, T ), µ is the average value of the considered distribution,
cov represents the covariance, and F () is the cumulative distribution function.
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Because of the tax, the post-tax as well as the tax liability ordering may differ
with respect to the one observed before the tax8. To consider this phenomenon
the concentration coefficients for the post-tax CZ and the tax liability distribution
CT can be evaluated: they measure the inequality of these distributions once
ordered according to the pre-tax order. More formally,
C =
2 · cov(, F (X))
µ
(13)
where GX = CX by definition and GZ ≥ CZ and GT ≥ CT . A proportional
tax leaves the post-tax as well as the tax liability inequality unchanged, so that
GX = GZ = GT and no re-ranking can occur. If the tax is progressive, that is
the average tax rate τ¯n =
τn
xn
is a non decreasing function of the pre-tax income,
T is distributed more unequally than X, and, conversely, Z shows a lower degree
of inequality [25]. The overall redistributive effect RE can be measured by RE =
GX − GZ = (GX − CZ) − (GZ − CZ) where GX − CZ = RS is the Reynolds-
Smolensky index, and GZ −CZ = RAPK is the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index,
which measures the extension of the re-ranking occurred in the transition from the
pre- to the post-tax incomes. Finally, the degree of tax progressivity is measured
by the Kakwani index K = CT −GX . Note also that RS and K are linked by the
overall average tax rate θ =
∑N
n=1 τn∑N
n=1 xn
as follows RS = θ
1−θK.
4.2. Efficiency
Having defined how to measure the progressivity of an income tax, we have to
handle with the problem of measuring its inefficiency, that is a concept related to
the structure of EMTRs. Generally speaking and by considering homogeneous
taxpayers, if the tax is progressive, then τ ′n ≥ τ¯n where
τ ′n =
∆τn
∆xn
(14)
is the EMTR, which evaluates the increase of the taxpayer’s net tax liability τn
due to an increase in her pre-tax income xn.
Besides statutory tax rates, real world tax systems allow tax credits that
decrease the net amount each taxpayer has to pay; as described in Subsection 3.1,
8This means that after the tax some taxpayers may be poorer (their post-tax income z is
lower) than others even if their pre-tax income x is greater; or some taxpayers may face a higher
net tax liability τ even if their pre-tax income x is lower.
13
the Italian PIT considers a set of linearly decreasing ones9. In these cases, given
an income x, the effective marginal tax rate τ ′ is equal to the statutory tax rate
tj plus the slope of each tax credit the taxpayer can benefit
10: τ ′ = tj + ∆c1∆x +
∆c2
∆x
.
Given the previous considerations, the trade-off between the redistributive
effect and the structure of the effective marginal tax rates is clear. In order for
both the overall redistributive effect RE and the Reynolds-Smolensky index RS
to be the highest, the tax distribution should favor the poorest taxpayers and
taxpayers belonging to the middle class, and disadvantage richest taxpayers. This
can be obtained by three channels: (a) low statutory tax rates and (b) high slopes
of the effective tax credits for the poorest taxpayers as well as (c) high statutory
tax rates for richest taxpayers. By contrast, high statutory tax rates as well as
high slopes of the effective tax credits imply higher effective marginal tax rates,
that should be avoided on the efficiency point of view. We can handle with this
problem by letting the EA minimize the EMTR weighted average value:
I =
1
N
N∑
n=1
τ ′n. (15)
Our problem then considers two constraints, one parameter to be maximized
and one parameter to be minimized. Optimal solutions are tax structures that
yield a specific tax revenue (this means the deviation of the computed tax revenue
from the target one should be closest as possible to zero), and guarantee that
the share of losing taxpayers (with respect to the situation observed before the
tax reform) is the closest as possible to zero (this is very important, because we
do not want RS to increase only because the richer taxpayers face a higher net
tax liability, given the tax cut). By considering these two constraints, admittable
solutions balance all the possible combinations of RS and I.
9If the tax system does not allow tax credits as well as allowances at all, the progressivity
of the tax depends only on the rate schedule Ψ(x); as a consequence, the statutory tax rates tj
always correspond to the effective marginal tax rates τ ′n for all income levels. If the tax system
allows a constant tax credit for all taxpayers, then the statutory tax rates tj correspond to the
effective marginal tax rates τ ′n for all income levels, except for the income levels characterized by
a nil net tax liability (the so called “no tax area”).
10As an example, consider an employee characterized by x = 10, 000, and d1 = d2 = c2 =
c3 = 0. In this situation, λ = 2, 300, whilst c1 = 1, 789.80, so that τ = 510.20. Were the
pre-tax income x equal to 10,100, the corresponding values would be: λ = 2, 323, c1 = 1, 785.29,
τ = 537.71. Then the effective tax rate is 27.51%. The statutory tax rate this taxpayer has to
face is equal to tj = 0.23, whilst the derivative of c1 with respect to x is
∂c1
∂x = − 90220,000 = −0.0451.
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5. Measuring Equity and Efficiency: the Italian Case
5.1. The Data and the Micro-simulation Model
As input data we make use of a static micro-simulation model developed by
Simone Pellegrino about 10 years ago and constantly updated. It is written in
STATA and is able to estimate the most important taxes and contributions which
characterize the Italian fiscal system. Here we employ the micro-simulation model
module concerning the PIT updated to the 2014 fiscal year. Technical details
regarding the structure of previous versions of this microsimulation model and its
applications to the analysis of the Italian PIT and the analysis of inequality indexes
decompositions can be found in Pellegrino et al. [26], Morini and Pellegrino [7],
Vernizzi and Pellegrino [27] and Monti et al. [28].
The micro-simulation model employs, as input data, those provided by the
Bank of Italy [29] in its Survey on Household Income and Wealth (BI-SHIW),
published in 2016 with regard to the 2014 fiscal year. The BI-SHIW survey contains
information on household income and wealth of 8,156 households and 19,366
individuals. The sample is representative of the Italian population, composed
of about 24.7 million households and 60.8 million individuals.
Considering individual taxpayers, results concerning the PIT gross income
distribution, and the distribution of all tax variables as well as the overall tax
revenue are very close to the Ministry of Finance’s official statistics [30]. This
instrument is then suitable for the type of empirical analysis we propose.
5.2. The Effect of the Tax Reform Implemented by the Government
Table 1 (column (a)) shows the inequality indexes, I, θ (x100) and T¯ in the
2014 fiscal year before the tax reform. The Gini coefficient for the gross income
distribution GX is 45.253, whilst that for the net income distribution GZ is 40.249.
The overall redistributive effect RE is 5.004. The concentration coefficient for
the net income distribution CZ is 40.161, whilst that on the net tax liability
distribution CT is 67.280; therefore, the Reynolds-Smolensky RS index is equal
to 5.092 and the Kakwani index K is 22.027. The overall average tax rate θ is
18.776%, whilst the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index RAPK is equal to 0.088; I
is equal to 24.600% and T¯ to 151.685 billion euro.
Table 1 (column (b)) also presents the indexes after the tax reform implemented
by the Italian government, which is our reference situation. The Gini coefficient for
the net income distribution GZ is 39.810, so that the overall redistributive effect
RE is 5.443. The concentration coefficient for the net income distribution CZ is
39.677, whilst that on the net tax liability distribution CT is 71.276; therefore,
the Reynolds-Smolensky RS index increases to 5.575 and the Kakwani index K
to 26.023. The overall average tax rate θ decreases to 17.645% (and T¯ to 142.545
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Table 1: Indexes for Taxpayers Before and After the Tax Reform
Index
Pre-reform
Value (a)
Post-reform
Value (b)
GX 45.253 45.253
GZ 40.249 39.810
RE 5.004 5.443
CZ 40.161 39.677
CT 67.280 71.276
RS 5.092 5.575
K 22.027 26.023
RAPK 0.088 0.133
I 24.600 25.834
θ 18.776 17.645
T¯ 151.685 142.545
billion euro), whilst the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index RAPK increases to 0.133
and I to 25.834.
Given the peculiarities (see Subsection 3.2) of the tax instrument applied by
the Italian government, these results are not surprising: in particular, note that
RAPK shows a branded deterioration; moreover, also I increases because of the tax
reform: taxpayers belonging to the 24-26 thousand euro class (about 1.3 million)
are characterized by EMTRs equal to 80% (Figure 2), given the sharply slope of
the cash transfer in this income range (see Eq. 11).
By considering a tax reduction of exactly the same amount, we show that an
EA is able to obtain a set of possible solutions that simultaneously optimize both
equity and efficiency, given the revenue and the no losing taxpayers constraints.
Therefore these results are ameliorative and more balanced with respect the ones
obtained by the Italian government.
In this first paper regarding taxes and MOEAs11, the 2014 Italian tax reform
is a perfect case study; we prefer to consider a reform reducing the tax revenue
11To the best of our knowledge, the unique attempt to apply an evolutionary computation
to taxation is the work by Morini and Pellegrino [7], which employs a mono-objective genetic
algorithm for solving the same problem discussed in the present paper. This analysis primarily
focuses on the tax redistribution side; the authors apply some constraints to the allowable
parameters of the tax in order to avoid too imaginative solutions, but they do not take explicitly
into account the relation between equity and efficiency. In particular, the authors get a solution
which considerably enhances the redistributive effect as well as the level of the no tax area for
all kinds of taxpayers at the expense of the level of the effective marginal tax rates, especially for
taxpayers characterized by a pre-tax income slightly higher the “no tax area”. The main limit of
this cited work is the mono-objective nature of the solution approach, not sufficient to support
the decision makers in the process of the design of a PIT system.
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Figure 2: EMTRs for an Employee
because in so doing we have not to handle with two kinds of discretionary choices:
1) the highest admittable statutory marginal tax rate can be set equal to the
present top one (were the target tax revenue equal or higher than the present
one, the highest admittable statutory marginal tax rate should be higher than the
present one in order to obtain a feasible solution); 2) were the target tax revenue
higher than the present one a positive share of losing taxpayers would be allowed;
the choice of this share would be discretionary and results would depend on it. This
does not mean that our empirical strategy cannot be employed to an equal-yield
tax reform, but in this case choices 1) and 2) should be previously set; similarly
for a tax reform enhancing the tax revenue.
6. A Tax Evolutionary Decision Support System
The goal of our DSS is to present the policy-maker a set of different, equally
acceptable candidate solutions to choose from. We employ a multi-objective
evolutionary algorithm to optimize the plausible goals of a PIT reform; the whole
process is sketched in Algorithm 1. The final goal is to find multiple points on
the Pareto front, each one corresponding to a different tax structure, optimal with
respect to some specific goal. Indeed, the more diverse the Pareto front, the better.
However, a standard MOEA cannot be directly exploited as the situation presents
few peculiarities.
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Algorithm 1 Main process
1: P0 = ∅
. Add ne slightly modified versions of the current tax structure
2: while |P0| < ne do
3: solution← mutate(current solution)
4: if Ξ < τΞ and Γ < τΓ then
5: P0 ← P0 ∪ {solution}
6: end if
7: end while
. Add nr random tax structures
8: while |P0| < ne + nr do
9: solution← random solution()
10: if Ξ < τΞ and Γ < τΓ then
11: P0 ← P0 ∪ {solution}
12: end if
13: end while
. Create a Pareto front using NSGA-II
14: Pfinal ← NSGA2(P0)
15: Remove unfeasible solution from Pfinal
First, the structure of a PIT is rather complex, and the different parameters
deeply interconnected. To broaden the applicability of the proposed solution,
all tax structures are encoded as flat lists of real numbers, each one from zero
to one S = (li). With such a choice, the structure of a chromosome is simple
and its validity is problem-independent; all individuals may be evaluated, as all
chromosomes correspond to an acceptable tax structure; crossover operators may
always be used; and, it allows the exploitation of established optimizers such as
NSGA-II.
However, the performance of evolutionary algorithms increase significantly
when the locality principle holds true, that is, when small changes in the genome
cause small changes in the phenotype, and eventually small changes in the fitness
[31]. The adopted encoding is likely to destroy the semantic of the parameters,
invalidating the locality principle. For instance, a set of chromosomes is used for
the statutory marginal tax rates, and each value encodes the normalized offset over
the previous one; all possible values yield to a valid set of statutory marginal tax
rates, but change on value is going to change the meaning of all successive ones.
Another problem arises from the fact that a reasonable PIT must guarantee
that both the deviation of the computed tax revenue from the target one (Γ) and
the share of losing taxpayers (Ξ) must be almost zero. First, a fuzzy concept like
almost zero is difficult to be quantified as a formula. Moreover, imposing these hard
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constraints would result in a quite difficult problem with few acceptable solutions
surrounded by vast infeasible region. Evolutionary algorithms are based on the
concept of differential survival : two different solutions must be comparable, and
one must yield an advantage over the other, even if almost imperceptible. Being
able to choose between different alternatives is required by the selection process,
but it is not possible to compare infeasible solutions.
To reduce the infeasible regions, instead of using a hard constraint, both the
deviation from the target tax revenue Γ and the share of losing taxpayers Ξ have
been included in generic penalty term: P = Ξ + Γ + max(Ξ,Γ), that is, the sum of
the two factors plus their infinity norm. The MOEA core was asked to minimize P
as one of its objective, the structure of the penalty term suggests the evolutionary
core to reduce both factors, giving priority to the one currently worse. The penalty
term is used to create a small feasible region close to acceptable solutions (Ξ < τΞ
and Γ < τΓ), to allow the evolutionary core to optimize the structure. However,
an excessive deviation or share of losers is unacceptable, and the fitness function
is set to zero in such cases, discarding all individuals from the population.
As the feasible regions artificially created are small compared to the search
space, a random initialization of the initial population is likely to be ineffective.
Our approach requires a initialization procedure, where the search space is sampled
either fully randomly or around the current PIT structure, in order to find a
reasonable number of feasible solutions to start with.
As we don’t know the value of the optimal solutions, the NSGA-II algorithm
is run for a given amount of generations. Moreover, it has been slightly tweaked:
the crossover operator is a blend crossover [32, 33]; the mutation is performed by
applying a Gaussian mutation. Values outside the valid range [0, 1] are clipped.
7. Application of the DSS to the Case Study
7.1. Chromosomes Definition
In this section we present how we let the EA choose each chromosome (chr). In
this respect, we follow the strategy described in the article by Morini and Pellegrino
[7] since our application refers to an updated version of the same microsimulation
model on the same country and on the same tax reform. As a consequence, we
employ 36 chromosomes necessary to obtain the 33 parameters of the Italian PIT.
The first set of chromosomes (from 1 to 6) is used in order to define the value
of the five statutory marginal tax rates tj as follows
tj = tmin +
j∑
φ=1
chrφ
tmax − tmin∑6
φ=1 chrφ
(16)
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for j = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and φ = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6); we impose them to range between
10% (tmin) and 43% (tmax), and to comply with the condition tj < tj+1.
A second set of five chromosomes (from 7 to 11) defines the four upper limits
(ULρ) of the thresholds, being ULρ < ULρ+1, ranging between 15,000 (ULmin)
and 100,000 (ULmax). More precisely,
ULρ = ULmin +
ρ∑
φ=7
chrφ
ULmax − ULmin∑11
φ=7 chrφ
(17)
for ρ = (1, 2, 3, 4) and φ = (7, 8, 9, 10, 11).
We then employ seven chromosomes for the definition of Cr1 . In particular,
4 chromosomes φ = (12, 13, 14, 15) describe the level of the no tax area mr with
r = (1, 2, 3, 4):
m1 = 8, 000 + chr12(0.9 · UL1 − 8, 000) (18)
m2 = 0.9375 ·m1 − 0.2 · chr13 · 0.9375 ·m1 (19)
m3 = m2 + chr14(0.96875 ·m1 −m2) (20)
m4 = 0.6 ·m1 − 0.3 · chr15 ·m1 (21)
where 0.2 and 0.3 are arbitrarily chosen, whilst the other parameters are set
according to the present tax structure in order to preserve the rank of mr. In
this respect, we do not consider the inequality Ω = 1, 880 6= 1, 840 = t1m1, and we
let t1m1 be equal or greater than 1,840 instead of 1,880. Finally, we employ three
chromosomes φ = (16, 17, 18) in order to define parameters ar with r = (1, 2, 3) in
the range 0− t1mr. In so doing, we chose all the relevant parameters defining the
shape of the four effective tax credits for earned incomes (note that the present tax
code sets a4 equal to zero). We do not let these effective tax credits be piecewise
decreasing with respect to limits others than those observed in the rate schedule.
Were this tax credit decreasing with respect to other thresholds, the number and
the level of effective marginal tax rates would not be under control: on the contrary,
we want to minimize both the number and the level of all effective tax rates.
Turning to cH2 , we let c
Hpl
2 be chosen between c
Hp
2min = 600 and c
Hp
2max = 5, 000,
being the present values ranging between 950 and 1,420. We then employ five
chromosomes φ = (19, 20, 21, 22, 23) to set the four tax credits for dependent
children. In particular,
cHpl2 = c
Hp
2min +
j∑
φ=19
chrφ
cHp2max − cHp2min∑23
φ=19 chrφ
(22)
Similarly to the present tax code, we impose the potential tax credit be higher
for households with more than 3 children and lower for those with fewer than 3
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children, as well as higher for children aged 3 or less and lower for a child aged more
than 3. We then add chr24 in order to set q between 30,000 and 200,000 and chr25
in order to set e between 0 and 75,000, being the present values equal to 95,000
and 15,000, respectively. Then chr26 sets c
HF
2 between zero and 2,000. Turning
to cS2 , we let c
Sp
2 be chosen between 500 and 2,500 (chr27), and we employ chr28
to set u between zero and cSp2 . Following the present structure of this tax credit,
we allow cS2 to be piecewise linearly decreasing with respect to three thresholds:
0−UL1, UL1−w and w− k where UL2 < w < UL3 and k > UL4 by introducing
chromosomes φ = (29, 30):
w = UL1 + chr29(UL3 − UL1) (23)
k = w + chr30(150, 000− w) (24)
We then define cO2 by letting c
O
2 p be chosen between 0.75 · cHp12 and 0.95 · cHp12
(chrφ = 31), and letting this tax credit be linearly decreasing between zero and k,
zero otherwise.
The last set of chromosomes φ = (32, 33, 34, 35, 36) defines the third kind of
tax credits c3. The tax credit for tenants considers
tenants1 = 1, 500 · chr32 (25)
tenants2 = tenants1 · chr33 (26)
tenants3 = tenants1 + chr34(2 · tenants1) (27)
whilst chromosomes φ = (35, 36) set the percentage of the expenses the tax law
admits as further tax credits for items of expenditure. We let the EA choose both
expenditure1 and expenditure2 between 0% and 100% (at present equal to 19%
and 50%, respectively.
7.2. Results: Best Solutions and Pareto Front
We ask the DSS to select an initial population of ne = 1, 000 individuals, that is
1,000 different tax structures, each of them composed by 36 chromosomes defining
the 33 PIT parameters. We set τΞ = 5% and τΓ = 0.5%, and let the EA evolve for
2,000 generations, and we get all the possible solutions that lie upon the Pareto
Front. By considering our constraints, that is RS, I, the share of losing taxpayers
Ξ and the percentage deviation of the computed tax revenue of each run from the
target one Γ, Table 2 shows some solutions we found on the Pareto front where
RS is greater than the pre-reform value (5.092), I is lower than the pre-reform
value (24.600%). We rank these solution according to RS, in ascending order.
These solutions are all different and all equally optimal. Among these, the
policy maker can then choose the preferred one. For example, the government
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might prefer a tax structure able to guarantee a low I at the expense of RS. In
this case it would choose the solution depicted in line 4 of Table 2, in which I is
21.0% and RS is 5.231; note that this solution is not able to perfectly fit the target
tax revenue (since Γ is 0.4%) and it causes Ξ to be high (1.5%). On the contrary,
the government could prefer a solution with a high RS at the expense of I; in this
case it would choose the solution depicted in the last line of Table 2, in which Γ is
0.4% and Ξ is 1.6%.
In the next subsection we decide to explore in greater details the solution
depicted in the bold line of Table 2, because this solution is able to perfectly fit
the target tax revenue (Γ=0) and to guarantee a very low Ξ. By contrast, with
respect to the set of solutions presented in Table 2, this one guarantees values
placed in mid-table for what concerns RS and I.
Table 2: Solutions on the Pareto Front
RS Γ Ξ I
5.124 0.4 0.4 23.0
5.144 0.3 1.3 23.3
5.219 0.2 0.1 23.3
5.231 0.4 1.5 21.0
5.233 0.5 1.2 23.3
5.263 0.2 0.9 23.6
5.264 0.4 1.1 23.2
5.306 0.5 1.3 23.0
5.311 0.2 0.3 23.2
5.318 0.3 0.3 23.2
5.342 0.0 0.4 23.3
5.352 0.1 0.4 23.3
5.355 0.4 0.3 23.2
5.363 0.5 0.4 23.2
5.378 0.3 0.5 23.3
5.382 0.5 0.4 23.3
5.426 0.4 1.6 23.6
7.3. Results: a Specific Tax Structure
Table 3 shows pre- and post-reform PIT parameters according to the specific
solution we decided to describe. In order to balance the highest admittable RS
and the lowest admittable I, the bottom marginal tax rate t1 should considerably
decrease from 23% to 16.16%. This is a branded reduction, which lowers the gross
tax liability not only for the poorest taxpayers but also for all the others. Given
the revenue as well as the equity-efficiency constraints, the remaining statutory
tax rates face changes of minor importance: t2 increases by about 2% (from 27 to
29.01), whilst t3 decreases by about 2% (from 38 to 36.17); t4 decreases only a little
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(from 41 to 40.36%), whilst, not surprisingly, the EA chose the highest admittable
value for t5, the present top marginal tax rate (43%). For what concerns the
bandwidth of the thresholds, the first two remain unchanged (UL1 is still 15,000,
whilst UL2 increases from 28,000 to 28,723), whilst the third and the fourth narrow
(UL3 drops from 55,000 to 33,690, UL4 drops from 75,000 to 66,525) in order for
the top one to widen.
In our multi-objective empirical strategy the “no tax area” enlarges for
employees and pensioners (paramenters m1, m2 and m3) only a little (about 400
euro), whilst it even shrinks by 13 euro (parameterm4) for self-employed taxpayers.
On the contrary, employing a mono-objective genetic algorithm, Morini and
Pellegrino [7] find very wider values for the “no tax area” of all kind of taxpayers.
Here the need of balancing the revenue constraint, the share of losing taxpayers
as well as the maximization of RS and the minimization of I is particularly clear:
the “no tax area” implies a zero EMTR, so that the wider the “no tax area” the
easiest not only the reduction of I, but also the rise of K and RS; however, the
wider the “no tax area” the more the revenue constraint become relevant, and the
more EMTRs should increase in order to comply with this constraint. Since I has
to be minimized, our EA does not enlarge too much the “no tax area” in order to
reduce EMTRs also for taxpayers belonging to the “middle class” and to apply
not remarkable reductions for richest taxpayers.
To properly understand these results, the distribution of taxpayers by income
classes is crucial: in Italy about one third of taxpayers earns 10 thousand euro
or less, about one third of taxpayers earn an income between 10 and 20 thousand
euro, and a remaining third an higher income.
This overall result on the structure of EMTRs (that also depends on the
other tax parameters that we will discuss below) can be summarized by looking to
Figure 3, which shows the EMTRs for an employee without dependent individuals
(similar results can be observed by considering other types of taxpayers).
To continue with the parameter list, the ones defining the shape of the effective
tax credits for employees and pensioners younger than 75 (a1 and a2) increase (a1
from 902 to 1,146, a2 from 470 to 622), whilst a3 (that refers to pensioners older
than 75) shrinks a little (from 486 to 474); in these cases there is not a remarkable
impact on the slope of these tax credits before and after the EA tax reform.
On the contrary, the shape of the tax credit for the spouse significantly change:
cSp2 increases from 800 to 902, whilst u is set equal to zero, w decreases from 40
thousand euro to a value just above UL1 and k suffers only a little decrease (from
80,000 to 75,516). Differently from the paper by Morini and Pellegrino [7], all
the four cHpl2 potential tax credits for dependent children considerably increase;
the increase is huge in particular for cHp42 and c
HF
2 : this is possible because these
two tax credits benefit a small number of taxpayers. Note also that the slope
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Table 3: Present and Computed PIT Parameters
Parameters
Present
Value
Computed
Value
t1 0.23 0.16157
t2 0.27 0.29082
t3 0.38 0.36169
t4 0.41 0.40361
t5 0.43 0.42999
UL1 15,000 15,000.00000
UL2 28,000 28,723.41144
UL3 55,000 33,689.54860
UL4 75,000 66,525.28713
m1 8,145 8,579.37320
m2 7,500 7,952.20120
m3 7,750 8,279.83477
m4 4,800 4,787.04904
a1 902 1,146.11353
a2 470 622.37089
a3 486 473.74773
cSp2 800 902.15935
u 110 0.00000
w 40,000 15,198.627880
k 80,000 75,515.55867
cOp2 750 822.15951
cHp12 950 1,060.90799
cHp22 1,150 1,379.61044
cHp32 1,220 1,840.84226
cHp42 1,420 3,329.82064
q 95,000 80,246.93436
e 15,000 26,483.97576
cHF2 1,200 1,901.60493
tenants1 300 540.80588
tenants2 150 170.43651
tenants3 992 1,316.85310
expenditure1 0.19 0.16025
expenditure2 0.50 0.40264
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Figure 3: EMTRs for an Employee
of cHpl2 (given by parameter e) decreases with l (even if parameter q decreases),
and this positively affects I. Not surprisingly, parameters tenants1, tenants2 and
tenants3 increase: they contribute to raise RS (because the tax credit for tenants
particularly favors poorest taxpayers) with no effects on I, since they are constant
in the income ranges they apply.
Finally, parameters expenditure1 and expenditure2 decrease, the former from
19 to 16, and the latter from 50 to 40%: tax credit for items of expenditure is
enjoyed by taxpayers belonging to all income deciles and it does not depend on
income, so that the increase of these parameters is not useful for both RS and I
targets.
7.4. A Closer Focus on the Results
The MOEA reform reduces the tax revenue by 9.14 billion euro with respect
to the tax structure applied before the tax reform. It is able to secure no losing
taxpayers: only 0.42% (about 170 thousand income units) of the overall taxpayers
loses, and on average they lose 108.6 euro; in particular, all these few losing
taxpayers earn an income above 28 thousand euro and all poorer taxpayers do
not lose. About 24% of taxpayers does not win and does not lose12, whilst the
12We consider as unaffected taxpayers for whom the difference between the net tax liability
before and after the tax reform is less than one euro.
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remaining 75.6% wins, on average 302 euro. 54.31% of this tax cut accrues to
taxpayers belonging the the 15-28 thousand euro class, whilst 22.66% to the ones
of the 8-15 thousand euro class and 15.45% to the 28-55 class (Table 4).
Table 4: The Composition of the Tax Cut
Income Classes
(thousand euro)
Composition
(%)
0-8 2.19
8-15 22.66
15-28 54.31
28-55 15.45
55-75 3.11
above 75 2.27
Total 100.00
Given the multi-objective nature of our methodology, this composition is very
different from the one obtained in the paper by Morini and Pellegrino [7], in which
a very higher share on the 8-15 class and a very lower share on the 28-55 class is
discussed: this is not possible in our framework because a higher share of the tax
cut on the poorest taxpayers would negatively affect I. The two papers have in
common the shares on the very rich and the very poor taxpayers. Only 2.19% of
the tax cut favors the 0-8 income class; this may seem counterintuitive, but it has a
technical explanation: in Italy the negative income taxation is not possible, so that
taxpayers with a nil net tax liability cannot be affected by whatever tax reform.
Finally, 5.4% of the tax cut favors taxpayers with incomes above 55 thousand euro:
also this result is counterintuitive, but it depends on the complex tax structure
characterized by three dozens of parameters; were the tax structure simpler, the
EA would obtain a lower share also in this part of the income distribution.
We can finally discuss the effect of the EA tax reform on the inequality indexes
(Table 5, column (c)).
The Gini coefficient for the net income distribution GZ is 40.002, so that the
overall redistributive effect RE is 5.251. The concentration coefficient for the net
income distribution CZ is 39.911, whilst that on the net tax liability distribution
CT is 70.190; therefore, the Reynolds-Smolensky RS index is then 5.342 and the
Kakwani index K is 24.937. The overall average tax rate θ is equal to 17.642%,
whilst the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index RAPK is 0.091; I is 23.342% and T¯ is
equal to 142.524 billion euro. Comparing RS and I as well as RAPK for the two tax
reforms (Table 5, columns (b) and (c)), we can observe that all of them are lower
when the EA reform is considered, as expected. The EA reform better balances
RS and I, that is it takes into account the trade-off between equity and efficiency:
the first is obviously lower (5.342 instead of 5.575), and also the second is obviously
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Table 5: Inequality Indexes for Taxpayers: EA Results
Index
Pre-reform
Value (a)
Government
Value (b)
EA
Value (c)
GX 45.253 45.253 45.253
GZ 40.249 39.810 40.002
RE 5.004 5.443 5.251
CZ 40.161 39.677 39.911
CT 67.280 71.276 70.190
RS 5.092 5.575 5.342
K 22.027 26.023 24.937
RAPK 0.088 0.133 0.091
I 24.600 25.834 23.342
θ 18.776 17.645 17.642
T¯ 151.685 142.545 142.524
lower (23.342% instead of 25.834%); since the government reform involves only one
fourth of the taxpayers, whilst the EA one involves all of them, also RAPK is very
lower (0.091 instead of 0.133) and close to that observed before the tax reform
(Table 5, column (a)). Note that the EA reform also improves RS and I with
respect the pre-reform situation, due to the difference in the tax revenue.
8. Conclusions
This paper shows how a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm can be a useful
tool for helping policy-makers in setting a reform of the tax system. We consider
a real-world tax reform involving the Italian personal income tax. In particular,
the government decides to change one parameter of this tax in order to reduce the
net tax liability only for a specific group of taxpayers.
The result is a decrease of the tax revenue by about 9 billion euro, an increase
of the redistributive power of the tax at the expenses of both the average level of
taxpayers’ marginal tax rates and the re-ranking effect exerted by the tax.
The evolutionary algorithm we employ evaluates a set of equal-yield tax reforms
involving all the 33 parameters of the tax; all these tax structures are able to
better balance equity and efficiency as well as to control the re-ranking effect; by
considering the situation observed before the tax reform, this methodology also
allows the solutions to minimize the share of losing taxpayers. We obtain 187
different tax structures that are equally optimal for the problem under discussion.
They range from solutions with low values for the redistributive effect and the
average marginal tax rates to solutions with higher values for both these indicators,
depending on the share of the losing taxpayers and the percentage deviation from
the target tax revenue.
27
Among these solutions, the government can choose the preferred one. As an
example, here we discuss a solution that perfectly fit the target tax revenue and
permit a very low share of losing taxpayers. With respect to the government
reform, it is able to considerably reduce the average value of the effective marginal
tax rates at the expenses of the redistributive effect, showing a trade-off between
equity and efficiency for this problem.
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